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that the court erred in holding that a donation may be tacitly
revoked. It seems that in every case the intention to revoke
should be clearly and expressly shown, and when the immovable
property is concerned, the agreement to revoke should be reduced
to writing.
LELAND H. COLTHARP, JR.

TAXATION OF VEssELs-For many years W. G. Coyle & Company, a Louisiana corporation, had conducted a marine terminal
and water traffic operations at New Orleans. In 1934 it began
also to operate as a towing concern on the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway. In 1937 DeBardeleben Coal Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, acquired all of the assets of the Louisiana corporation through merger. The marine terminal and towing operations
were continued in the trade name used by the Louisiana corporation for those enterprises. These commercial enterprises were
carried on in substantially the same manner before and after the
merger. At all times New Orleans was the principal operating
base of twelve vessels;' and they were never in state of Delaware. Many factors clearly distinguished it from their other ports
of call, each accentuating the greater importance of New Orleans
in the operation of the vessels. 2 Each vessel was regularly engaged in interstate commerce.3 None of the vessels ever visited
1. This note is not concerned with the problem presented by eight additional barges which were operated solely within Alabama and were important in the decision of several points of the case. The discussion will be
limited to those vessels engaged in interstate commerce between New Orleans and ports in other states. See American Barge Line Co. v. Cave, .68 F.
Supp. 30, 40 (E.D. La. 1946).
2. See the trial judge's findings of fact, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 (Id. at 51).
He found that the Delaware corporation had continued the operations of
the Louisiana corporation without material change or interruption, using
the name "Coyle Lines" to benefit from the business reputation of the Louisiana corporation. New Orleans was found to be the location of the main
oflce from which Coyle Lines were controlled, the only machine and repair
shop, the place where crews were paid and took their weekly twenty-four
hour lay-off, the place where vessels were usually fueled, and the place where
all scheduled general repairs or minor "voyage" repairs were made. The
Coyle Lines common carrier water transportation business was operated
out of New Orleans with two Coyle Lines tugs and ten Coyle Lines barges,
to which it added approximately eight chartered tugs and many barges,
depending upon the tonnage offered for transportation.
3. Id. at 40. It also affirmatively appears from the opinion of the trial
judge that each of the vessels were absent from the port of New Orleans
for the greater part of the year. Since New Orleans was the only Louisiana
port of consequence in the operation of the lines, it would seem to follow,
though there is no express finding of fact on that point, that the vessels
were each beyond the borders of Louisiana for the greater part of the year.
Taking the year'1944 as typical, the court found that of the total number
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Delaware. The trial court 4 found that the tax situs of the vessels,
while owned by the Louisiana corporation was, under settled
principles, in Louisiana at New Orleans. The court said that the
Delaware corporation's practice in continuing to conduct the
business in the same manner, and in never using the vessels
in such a way that they would change their situs, was considered
as confirming Louisiana "as the already existent tax situs of all
of said movable property, and whatever additions were then or
subsequently made thereto, to so remain unchanged, until there
was effected the legally-possible establishment of another tax
situs for all or a portion thereof, by the permanent removal to
another state of all or part of said property."5
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court had
properly found the situs of the vessels to be in Louisiana. NQ
reference was made to the confirmed situs doctrine upon which
the trial court had apparently based its conclusion, and had
of hours in the year, the time spent in New Orleans by each vessel was in
no case greater than 38%. One of the tugs spent only 11% of the year in
New Orleans. Id. at 42.
4. American Barge Line Co. v. Cave, 68 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. La. 1948).
5. Id. at 49. But the trial judge permitted the taxpayer to recover under
La. Act 330 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8444.1-8444.3], providing for payment under protest and action to recover taxes improperly assessed. His
conclusion was apparently based on the fact that the assessment included
the eight barges which remained In Alabama for the entire tax year (see
note 1, supra) and the fact that the tax was levied under a statute providing
for apportionment (La. Act 170 of 1898, § 29, as last amended by La. Act 59
of 1944, § 1), taxes on vessels not normally being apportioned.
See trial

judge's conclusions of law, Nos. 7-9. 68 F. Supp. 30, 52.
As to these conclusions, the Circuit Court of Appeals said: "The fact that

the amount assessed against DeBardeleben was arrived at by including the
eight barges in Alabama is not ground for declaring the assessment against
that company void." Ott v. DeBardeleben Coal Corp., 166 F.(2d) 509, 514
(C.C.A. 5th, 1948). "The erroneous inclusion of property in an assessment
is ground for reduction, not cancellation." Id. at 515.
The Circuit Court of Appeals noted the contention of DeBardeleben that
the tax on a proportionate basis was void when levied on vessels (Id. at 511),
and, in connection with vessels belonging to other litigants, observed that
"so far as we have been able to find this principle of apportionment has
never been applied to watercraft using the high seas or inland waterways
(Id. at 514)." It did not, however, state any reason for differing with the
trial court's conclusion that the assessment of so many of DeBardeleben's
vessels that had their sole situs in Louisiana (under the trial court's confirmed situs theory quoted above) was void, if the assessment was made
under the Louisiana statute which clearly provides for apportionment. In
any event, there seems to be little merit to a contention of nullity on that
ground. If Louisiana may tax the full value of the vessels, as it could do if
it were their sole situs, no constitutional objection would appear to prevent
the taxation of a portion of their value under the statute.
Since the Circuit Court of Appeals rejected these reasons for holding the
tax invalid, and agreed with the trial court that the tax situs was in Louisiana, it held that the tax was properly imposed.
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discussed at some length in its opinion.6 Ott v. DeBardeleben

Coal Corporation,166 F. (2d) 509 (C.C.A. 5th, 1948) .7
Elementary principles of constitutional law place jurisdictional limitations on the power of a state to tax.8 These are
embodied in the doctrine of situs. A situs within the state is
indispensable to its power to tax. The term is given literal application in the case of immovable property, the fixed location of
6. American Barge Line Co. v. Cave, 68 F. Supp. 30, 48-49 (E.D. La. 1948).
This confirmed situs doctrine was not repeated as an articulate conclusion
of law at the end of the opinion. The only articulate conclusion of law which
mentioned the tax situs of the DeBardeleben vessels simply stated:
"6. The tax situs of all the DeBardeleben Coal Corporation's Coyle Lines
watercraft employed in its common carrier water transportation operations
out of the port of New Orleans, was in the state of Louisiana alone." Id. at 52.
It seems probable that this conclusion was reached on the theory that
the pre-merger situs was confirmed by operations after merger similar to
those before merger, for the trial court included in its articulate findings of
fact four statements concerning the pre-merger operations of the business.
Findings of fact Nos. 5-8. Id. at 51.
These included the following: "8. From 1937 on, the said Coyle operations
were continued without interruption or material change under the name of
the Coyle Lines, as the Marine Division of said DeBardeleben Coal Corporation was designated by it, in order to benefit by the long-established worldwide business reputation enjoyed by W. G. Coyle, Inc."
These findings of fact, coupled with the discussion of the theory of confirmed situs in the opinion, make it apparent that the theory was an important, if not the decisive factor in influencing the decision of the trial
court that the situs of the vessels was in Louisiana.
7. Certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 1529 (U. S. 1948). These were eleven consolidated cases, involving similar issues but presenting substantially different
facts. Though footnote reference will be made hereafter to the courts'
opinions on points involving several of the cases, this note is primarily concerned with the tax liability of DeBardeleben Coal Corporation, and that
only with regard to the vessels which moved between New Orleans and ports
of other states. For that reason, the highly complicated facts in the other
cases and the other issues in the DeBardeleben case will not be restated. It
is felt that their omission will not hinder an accurate analysis of the problem around which this note is centered.
8. "All subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends are
objects of taxation, but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the
soundest principles, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be
pronounced self evident." Marshall, C.J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S.
316, 429, 4 L.Ed. 579, 607 (1819).
Therefore, "the power of taxation, however vast In its character and
searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the State." Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S.
300, 319, 21 L.Ed. 179, 186 (1873).
The principle seemed so elementary that no constitutional provision was
thought necessary to form its basis. Decisions on the point antedate the
Fourteenth Amendment, which would appear necessary to its application to
the states. [See Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 U. S. 596, 15 L.Ed. 254
(1855), striking down a tax imposed by California on a vessel plying between ports of California, Oregon and New York. The vessel was owned
by a domiciliary of New York.] Of Saint Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Company,
78 U. S. 423, 20 L.Ed. 192 (1871); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U. S. 471, 21 L.Ed. 303
(1873); and Northern Central Railway Company v. Jackson, 74 U. S. 262,
19 L.Ed. 88 (1869), Thomas Reed Powell writes: "The three cases just considered were decided after the fourteenth amendment was a part of the
constitution .... There is no hint in the opinions that the court was using
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which makes it immune to the multitude of problems which beset
the determination of the tax situs of movables. In an effort to
simplify their solution, the Roman rule mobilia sequuntur personam was extended beyond its original scope 9 to apply to, the
field of taxation. This fiction of law fixes the location of the movable at the domicile of its owner. In the taxation of corporeal'
movables, need for its application usually arises where the movable has been moved from one state to another during the tax
year. Even in those cases a series of decisions has substantially
modified the doctrine by creating an exception permitting apportionment of taxes among states in which the movable remained
for a part of the year. It is settled that this exception applies to
the rolling stock of railroads and land transportation enterprises, 10 so the largest class of movables likely to move from one
state to another at frequent intervals has been excluded from what
formerly was the general rule, but now has been so limited as
to make it more in the nature of an exception. Two large classes
of movables commonly crossing state lines remain aircraft and
vessels. The doctrine has never been applied to vessels," and
a decision of the United States Supreme Court makes its applica2
tion to aircraft improbable.'
or needed to use the fourteenth amendment to save property from being
taxed elsewhere than at its proper situs. Taxation without jurisdiction seemed
to them as inherently vicious as taxation without representation had seemed
to their grandfathers and was to seem later to some of their granddaughters." Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit (1921) 7 Va. L. Rev. 167, 176.
9. "The rule or fiction of law that personal property, more especially
choses in action, has no situs away from the domicil of the owner at which
it is deemed to be present, originated, according to Savigny, in Rome....
It was never invented with a view to its being used as a rule to govern and
define the application and scope of taxation, nor was it intended to have
any other meaning than that, for the purpose of the sale and distribution
of property, any act, agreement, or authority which is sufficient in law where
the owner resides, shall pass the property as the place where the property
is, more especially to facilitate the distribution of decedents' estates by enabling owners to dispose of their property without embarrassment from their
ignorance of the laws of the country where it is." Bouvier, Law Dictionary
(Baldwin's Student ed. 1934) 1164.
10. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,
141 U. S. 18, 11 S.Ct. 876,
35 L.Ed. 613 (1890) established this doctrine and has been consistently followed.
11. Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit (1921) 7 Va. L. Rev. 245, 251;
Ott v. DeBardeleben Coal Corp., 166 F. (2d) 509, 514 (C.C.A. 5th, 1948).
12. "The doctrine of tax apportionment has been painfully evolved in
working out the financial relations between the States and interstate transportation and communication conducted on land and thereby forming a part
of the organic life of these States. Although a part of the taxing system of
this country, the rule of apportionment is beset with difficulties, but at all
events it grew out of and has established itself in regard to land commerce."
Frankfurter, J., in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300, 64 .S.Ct.
950, 964, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 1288 (1948), upholding a full-value, unapportioned tax
on aircraft by the state of the owner's domicile, though the planes were out
of the state for a substantial part of the tax year.
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Where, as in the instant case, a vessel has been engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce during the tax year, the general
rule of mobilia sequuntur personam applies and the vessel may
be taxed only at the domicile of the owner.' 3 Prior to the DeBardeleben decision this rule was thought to be subject to one
exception: a vessel which remained within the confines of a single
state for the entire tax year was taxable in that state, irrespective of the owner's domicile or its employment in interstate
commerce. 14 Such factors as registration, 5 "home port"'1 and
failure or inability of the vessels physically to enter the state of
the owner's domicile' 7 have been expressly held to be immaterial.
In the instant case, the district court recognized that the
tax situs of the vessels had been in Louisiana prior to the merger
of the Louisiana and Delaware corporations. 8 This was doubtless true, because the vessels were engaged in interstate com13. "[T]he power of taxation of vessels depends either upon the actual
domicile of the owner or the permanent situs of the property within the
taxing jurisdiction." Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 423, 26
S.Ct. 679, 683, 50 L.Ed. 1082, 1087 (1906). See also Iays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 U. S. 596, 15 L.Ed. 254 (1855); Saint Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
78 U.S. 423, 20 L.Ed. 192 (1871); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. 471, 21 L.Ed.
303 (1873); Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 S.Ct. 13, 56
L.Ed. 96 (1911); State ex rel. United States Lines Co. v. Second Judicial District Court of Nevada, 56 Nev. 38, 43 P.(2d) 173 (1936). An excellent discussion of the problem is Ambler, Personal Property Taxes on Vessels Regularly Engaged in Interstate or Foreign Commerce (1945) 20 Wash. L. Rev. 1.
14. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 25 S.Ct. 686,
49 L.Ed. 1059 (1905).
15. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 26 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed.
1082 (1906); 2 Cooley, Taxation (4 ed. 1924) § 453. See also Southern Pacific
Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 S.Ct. 13, 56 L.Ed. 96 (1911); 7 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (1921) § 4614.
16. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 26 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed.
1082 (1906) clarified the law on this point. Previously courts had loosely used
the term "home port" where the port was at the domicile of the owner, and
their language might be interpreted to indicate that the "home port" was a
controlling factor. In the cited case the two were in different states, and the
conflict was resolved in favor of the state of domicile. This is noted by
Stone, C.J., dissenting in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota: "That vessels
were to be taxed exclusively at the home port, whether or not it was the
domicile was rejected in Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky . . . and Southern
Pacific Co. v. Kentucky . . . and has never been revived." 322 U.S. 292, 314,
64 S.Ct. 950, 961, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 1297(n) (1948). See also Saint Louis v. Wiggins
Ferry Co., 78 U. S. 423, 431, 202 L.Ed. 192, 194 (1871), in which the court said:
"The solution of the question, where her home port is, when it arises, depends wholly upon her owner's residence."
17. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 S.Ct. 13, 56 L.Ed.
96 (1911); Tacoma Oriental Steamship Co. v. Tallant, 51 F.(2d) 359 (W.D.
Wash. 1931); State ex rel. United States Lines Co. v. Second Judicial District
Court of Nevada, 56 Nev. 38, 43 P.(2d) 173 (1936).

18. At the time of the merger Louisiana was "the already existent tax
...American Barge Line Co. v.
situs of all of said movable property.
Cave, 68 F. Supp. 30, 49 (E.D. La. 1946).
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merce and the domicile of their owner was Louisiana. That rule
and no other could justify their taxation in Louisiana. Consistent
application of the same rule would render them taxable solely
in Delaware when the two corporations merged and the Delaware corporation survived, for then the domicile of the owner
would be in Delaware. But the district court held that the continued oeration of the vessels in the same manner as before the
merger had the effect not only of continuing this existing situs
of the property belonging to the Louisiana corporation before
the merger, but also fixed in Louisiana the tax situs of "whatever
additions were then or subsequently made thereto."' 19 Apparently
this situs would continue "until there was effected the legallypossible establishment of another tax situs for all or a portion
thereof, by the permanent removal to another state of all or a
part of said property." This language would seem to indicate
that the fiction of law which located the property in Louisiana
for tax purposes solely because Louisiana was the domicile of
the owner could not operate to remove the tax situs to Delaware
when that state became the domicile of the owner. The power
of Delaware to tax and the double taxation of an instrumentality
of commerce which would result was not before the court, but
it would seem that Delaware's power to tax is unquestionable
20
under settled principles of law.

The Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the district court's
opinion as follows: "With respect to DeBardeleben, it found
that New Orleans was the home port of its tugboats and barges,
from which they operated; that . . . its watercraft were never

permanently away from that city; hence the tax situs was in,
Louisiana and the tugboats and barges having a tax situs there
could be taxed by the City of New Orleans."' 2 1 Another part of

the opinion stressed the fact that "None of the Coyle Lines watercraft ever permanently left the original situs in Louisiana." 22
Was this fact controlling the finding of the Circuit Court of
Appeals that "the Court below was correct in holding that the
tugboats and barges of DeBardeleben . . . were properly taxed
there? ' 23 In this connection it should be noted that the Circuit
24
Court of Appeals recognized that
19. Ibid.
20. See note 17, supra.
21. Ott v. DeBardeleben Coal Corp., 166 F.(2d)
1948) (Italics supplied).

509, 512-513 (C.C.A. 5th,

22. Id. at 512. Italics supplied.
23. Id. at 514.

24. The following excerpts are found in 166 F.(2d) 509, 514..
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"Under the decisions the regular or irregular stops at ports
in nondomiciliary States of watercraft moving in interstate
commerce do not establish tax situs in such states, and such
watercraft remain taxable only by the State of the owner's
domicile."
"Neither enrollment of a vessel at a particular port, even
though the vessel makes regular calls at the port of enrollment,

. .

. nor benefits received at a port, such as fire pro-

tection and wharves for loading and unloading accorded to
every vessel, of themselves confer the power to tax upon
the State of the port."
"The fact that none of the watercraft owned by... DeBarde-

leben has been within the State of Delaware, the State of
the owner's domicile, does not of itself control the right of
that State to tax the property. Tangible personal property
which has not acquired a tax situs elsewhere may be taxed
by the State of the owner's domicile although it has never
been brought within that State's boundaries."
"That no tax has been assessed by the State of the owner's
domicile has no bearing upon the right of another State to
tax. It is only when the personal property has acquired a
tax situs within a State other than the owner's domicile that
it may be taxed there."
What, then, was the basis of the decision? Was it the failure
of the vessels permanently to leave Louisiana, as seems to be
suggested by the language first quoted in this paragraph?2 5 Previously, the power of the non-domiciliary state to tax was thought
to be based not upon failure of the vessel permanently to leave,
but rather upon the continuous, uninterrupted presence of the
26
vessel within the borders of the taxing state. Otherwise, the
25. See note 21, supra.
26. "[WJhere vessels, though engaged in interstate commerce, are employed in such commerce wholly within the limits of a state, they are subject to taxation in that state, although they may have been registered or
enrolled at a port outside its limits." Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 309-310, 25 S.Ct. 686, 689-690, 49 L.Ed. 1059, 1063 (1905).
"As, in the case at bar, the owner of the vessels was domiciled in Illinois and the vessels were not employed exclusively in commerce between
points in the state of Kentucky, but were engaged in traffic between that
state and the ports of other states, including Illinois, it seems obvious that,
as a question of fact, they had no permanent situs in the state of Kentucky.
." Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 423, 26 S.Ct. 679, 683,
50 L.Ed. 1082, 1087 (1906).
"If a vessel is engaged in traffic between the ports of two or more states,
more or less continuously, it would seem that it can acquire no actual situs
other than the home port, I.e., the domicile of the owner." 2 Cooley, Taxation
(4 ed. 1924) § 451.
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vessel would remain liable to taxation by the domiciliary state'2 7
applying a rule of taxation thus restated by the Supreme Court
in a footnote to Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, a case involving
airplanes: "[N]o judicial restriction has been applied against the
domiciliary State except when property (or a portion. of fungible
units) is permanently situated in a State other than the domiciliary State. And permanently means continuously throughout
the year, not a fraction thereof, whether days or weeks. '28 (Italics supplied.)
Perhaps the decision was grounded upon the reason advanced by the district court and not repeated by the circuit court
of appeals: that a change of domicile would not effect a change
of tax situs of the vessels so long as the vessels were used in the
same manner as they had been prior to the change of domicile. 29
This seems illogical if the sole basis for taxation is domicile.8 0
The extension of the power to tax to additions made to the
property subsequent to the change of domicile is even more
wanting in theoretical foundation.
It is possible, however, that without accepting the reasoning
of the district court, the Circuit Court of Appeals thought it unwise to assume that the law provided that a vessel engaged in
interstate commerce could not acquire an actual situs in any
non-domiciliary state which it left for any part of the tax year.
There had been continuous presence in the non-domiciliary state
in Old Dominion Steamship Company v. Virginia,31 in which the
Supreme Court had found a situs away from the domicile. In no
case involving vessels had it been categorically stated that this
continuous presence was an essential to situs, though so much
implied in the quoted footnote to Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota.8 2 Perhaps actual situs may be obtained by something less
than continuous, uninterrupted presence, yet more than the aggregate of facts found to be inadequate in the decisions which
have refused to find a situs away from the domicile.38 Though no
27. See note 13, supra.
28. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 298, 64 S.Ct. 950, 955,
88 L.Ed. 1283, 1287 (1944).
29. American Barge Line Co. v. Cave, 68 F. Supp. 30, 49 (E.D. La. 1946).
30. 2 Cooley, Taxation (4 ed. 1924) § 451, quoted in note 26, supra.
31. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 25 S.Ct. 679,
50 L.Ed. 1082 (1905).
32. See note 28, supra.
33. See notes 15-17, supra. In the latest expression of the Supreme Court
on the subject, the court, rejecting the contention that the actual situs of
vessels was in the state of registration in which was located the home port
at which each vessel regularly called, said: "The facts which have been
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standard for future guidance appears in the opinion, the DeBardeleben case may be the first of a series which will come to
redefine the point at which situs is acquired in the non-domiciliary state. This development would seem desirable. If the power
of taxation is to be "exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person
and property,"84 it seems clear that a distant state which has done
no more than suffer a corporate owner to exist has less justification for taxing property than has the state in which the property has remained for a substantial part of the year.
ROBERT
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relied upon to show an actual situs of these ships in the port of New York
• . . fall short of the facts relied upon for a like purpose [in a number of
previous cases], where the judgments were that they were insufficient to
create a taxable situs other than that of the owner. The facts shown by no
means bring the case under the authority of Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, where it was held that the ships had acquired an actual situs." Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 77, 32 S.Ct. 14, 18, 56 L.Ed. 96, 102
(1911). Does this indicate that there is a middle ground in which an actual
situs might be found between the facts of the Old Dominion case and the
"insufficient" facts relied on in the other cases?
34. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 202, 26
S.Ct. 36, 37, 50 L.Ed. 150, 153 (1905).

